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Abstract
This paper examines the degree to which volatility in overnight interest rates leads to volatility in other
short-term interest rates, and whether this relationship differs in countries with different monetary
policy operating procedures.  In six of the nine countries, a significantly positive relationship is found
between the variance of the overnight rate and the variance of two or more longer-term rates, although
in Germany the relationship was negative.  Countries which directly target overnight rates tend to have
a lower variance, not just for the overnight rate, but also for other short-term interest rates, than
countries which target a repo rate.  The relationship between overnight-rate volatility and volatility at
other maturities is stronger for countries which set reserve requirements.  To the extent that market
volatility is an indicator of illiquidity, these results suggest that liquidity spillovers do exist across
different maturities in the money-market, and that central banks can influence liquidity conditions in
the money market at maturities different from that of their targeted rate.1
1. Introduction
Most central banks in developed countries target a designated policy rate both in their day-to-day
liquidity operations and in their “signalling operations”, i.e. public statements. They tend to differ,
however, in how aggressively they act to stabilise overnight interbank rates at or near the policy rate.
One of the justifications for an aggressive defence of the target rate in the overnight market is that this
will add stability to money markets considered more broadly – that is, at other maturities than the one
for which a policy rate is specified. Opposed to this is the view that since interest rates at the one or
three month level are more important for economic decision making, and since market participants
ignore fluctuations in extremely short-term markets when setting the prices for longer-term claims, the
stability of overnight markets is irrelevant to the goals of monetary policy.
This paper attempts to assess the degree to which volatility in overnight interbank rates affects
volatility patterns of short-term interbank rates at other maturities in nine developed economies.
Specifically, it examines the overall level of volatility of daily movements in short-term interest rates
at five maturities, and the effect of volatility in overnight markets on volatility at the other maturities.
To do this, generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models are estimated
for the overnight interest rate. The effects of the fitted GARCH variances on the variances of other
interest rates with maturities up to one year are then estimated.
In six of the nine countries studied, a significantly positive relationship (at the 95% level) is found
between the variance of the overnight rate and the variance of two or more longer-term rates. In four
of the remaining five countries, the coefficients are nearly always positive. This seems to confirm the
hypothesis that, within the experiences of different countries, periods of volatility in overnight rates
correspond to periods of volatility in non-targeted rates. Germany was the only country where the
relationship between overnight-rate volatility and volatility at other maturities was consistently
negative.
When estimated variances are compared between countries, however, it is found that countries which
directly target overnight rates tend to have a lower variance, not just for the overnight rate, but also for
other short-term interest rates, than countries which target a repo rate of up to 30 days. This first group
also sees a more rapid incorporation of the policy rate into overnight rates. Countries with reserve
requirements, including members of both of these groups, tend to have a stronger relationship between
overnight-rate volatility and the volatility of interest rates at other maturities than countries without
reserve requirements, suggesting that banks’ efforts to meet reserve requirements through
balance-sheet adjustment lead to a coincidence in episodes of interest-rate uncertainty at different
maturities.
To the extent that market volatility is an indicator of illiquidity (a proposition discussed below), these
results should have a number of implications for the liquidity characteristics of short-term
money-markets. For one thing, the results suggest that these markets are indeed linked to one another,
so that disruptions to the supply or demand of funds at one maturity (for example, through insufficient
or excessive injections of overnight funds by the central bank) can cause volatility spillovers to the
markets for funds at other maturities. Second, central banks can influence liquidity conditions in the
money market both through their “conduct” of monetary policy, and through the market “structure”
they create by setting reserve requirements.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the relevance of the
present work to the broader analysis of the determinants of market liquidity. Section 3 reviews the
techniques used by different central banks to control short-term interest rates. Section 4 describes the
data and the GARCH estimation technique used and presents results of the “within country” analysis.
Section 5 discusses differences in these results across countries, and suggests institutional features that
could account for them. Section 6 concludes.2
2. Interest-rate volatility and money-market liquidity
The primary volatility measure examined in this paper is the variance of the estimated residuals from a
regression of daily market interest rate changes on daily changes in policy rates. These variances
should exclude, to a large extent, volatility resulting directly from rapid contemporaneous movements
in policy rates. This leaves three possible sources for this volatility measure: uncertainty about the
future direction of policy, that is, fluctuations in the expected path of future rates; fluctuations in term
premia, including risk premia; and fluctuations in the supply and/or demand for funds at the
corresponding maturity.
In a fully liquid money-market, the underlying supply and demand for funds should not have an effect
on market interest rates, because marginal participants should be willing to lend or borrow as needed
when rates depart from fundamental values reflecting current and expected policy rates and term
premia. Thus, if a link can be found between supply and demand conditions and rate fluctuations, a
high degree of interest-rate volatility could be interpreted as indicating a low level of market liquidity.
Central banks can affect these patterns of supply and demand in two primary ways: through their own
practices in effecting the supply of central bank money, and through reserve requirements. If it can be
shown that there are systematic differences in interest-rate volatility that correspond to differences in
monetary policy operating procedures, this would be evidence that interest-rate volatility at least to
some extent results from supply and demand fluctuations.
For overnight rates, term premia and the expected path of future rates are irrelevant. Liquidity
conditions are thus likely to be the primary source of volatility for these rates, so we can use volatility
as a rough indicator of market liquidity. For other short-term interest rates, in the absence of reliable
measures of the market’s degree of certainty about the future path of monetary policy, the impact of
uncertainty about expected rates and of fluctuating term premia cannot be excluded. Any conclusions
that are drawn relating the volatility of these rates, through market liquidity, to monetary policy
operating procedures must thus be regarded as purely indicative and suggestive of areas for further
research.
3. The overnight rate and monetary-policy tactics
In recent years, several authors have examined and compared the effects of monetary policy
procedures on the stochastic characteristics of the interest rate process. These include Hamilton (1996)
and Roberds, Runkle and Whiteman (1996) for the US; Ayuso, Haldane and Restoy (1997) for the
UK, Spain, France and Germany; Panigirtzoglou, Proudman and Spicer (1998) for Germany, Italy and
the UK; and Escrivá and Fagan (1996) for the European Union countries. The present paper attempts
to build on this literature by expanding its geographic scope, specifically through a systematic analysis
of these effects in countries in North America, Europe and Japan, and by relating cross-country
differences in the observed effects more directly to the characteristics of monetary policy operating
procedures.
Table 1, reprinted from Borio (1997) and based on a BIS survey of central banks, identifies some of
the key features of monetary policy operating procedures for a selection of industrialised countries in
the period studied.
1 While no two central banks are strictly identical in terms of all the policy features
listed, it is useful to divide the countries listed into three broad groupings.
2
1 To a large degree, monetary policy procedures in the nine central banks studied remained essentially the same over the
1990-98 period, though strategies and many details of implementation were not always constant.
2 At the time Table 1 was constructed, Switzerland was unique among the countries surveyed in that it targeted a quantity
(transactions deposits) at the operational level rather than setting an explicit policy rate. Since that time, however, it has
moved closer to a repo-tendering regime.3
The first group specifies an overnight rate target as its policy rate. This group includes Australia,
Canada, Japan and the US In order to ensure that the actual market overnight rate does not deviate
excessively from the target, countries in this group tend to intervene in the money markets daily or
more frequently. Instruments used for these interventions include repurchase agreements (repos),
outright transactions, and shifts in the placement of government deposits.
The second group specifies a repo rate with a maturity of between one day and one month as its policy
rate, but also endeavours to stabilise the overnight rate. This group includes Austria, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and Sweden. The repo rate for transactions at the specified maturity(ies) is either explicitly
set through fixed-rate tenders, or targeted through decisions about the quantity offered under
variable-rate tenders. At the same time, the overnight rate is stabilised through such means as periodic
discretionary operations, signalling mechanisms or reserve requirements. Central banks in this group
tend to conduct their tendering operations once or a few times a week, i.e. less frequently than those in
the first group, though discretionary operations may take place more often.
The third group uses repo or repo-like transactions at one set of maturities (generally less than one
month) to target a policy rate for a different set of maturities (generally one to three months). This
group includes Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, though operational methods and frequencies
vary widely among these three countries. For the purposes of this paper, an important consequence of
this framework is that these central banks take little or no action to stabilise overnight rates.
An alternative way of classifying these countries is according to their use of reserve requirements.
Two of the countries in our first group (the US and Japan) and five of the six in the second group (all
except Sweden) set reserve requirements of some kind. Two members of the first group (Canada and
Australia), Sweden, and the three members of the third group either have no reserve requirements or
require only that banks maintain on average a positive level of “working balances” with the central
bank over some period.
Central banks also differ in the use of interest rates on official standing facilities as ceilings, floors,
and/or signals regarding the policy rate. However, differences (both among countries and over time) in
the conditions of access to such facilities and in banks’ willingness to avail themselves of them make
it difficult to establish a clear classification of countries on this basis.
There are a number of possible ways in which the institutional characteristics described so far could
influence interest-rate volatility. Regarding the choice of target, one would normally expect relatively
low volatility for the targeted policy rate itself. As discussed above, overnight rates are nevertheless
usually quite volatile even if actively targeted, because of uncertainties about the supply and demand
for funds in the very short run.
Even if the overnight rate is not targeted, excessive volatility in this rate could induce market
participants to borrow and lend outside of their preferred habitat, leading to higher volatility in these
other maturities as conditions adjust. This channel might be less likely to operate if large banks and
other specialised participants dominate the overnight market, so that other participants are unable or
unwilling to take advantage of overnight-rate pricing anomalies.
One way to test for the presence of volatility transmission from overnight rates to other rates would be
to examine countries in our third group, which neither target the overnight rate nor attempt to stabilise
it through other means. If the central bank does not take an active interest in stabilising overnight
rates, such rates are likely to be more volatile, but markets are less likely to take overnight-rate
movements as signals about the stance of monetary policy. Thus, if volatility transmission results from
monetary policy uncertainty, such countries should not have unusually high volatility at non-overnight
maturities. However, if overnight rate volatility leads ipso facto to volatility for other maturities, for
example through the shifting of participants into and out of their preferred maturity habitats, then
countries which do not attempt to stabilise overnight rates should have more volatile money markets at
all maturities.
Reserve requirements could potentially help to buffer interest-rate movements, by reducing the
sensitivity of bank activities to inflows and outflows of deposits. The tendency of banks to scramble
for or to dump reserves at the end of reserve-maintenance periods, however, often leads to higher4
overnight-rate volatility at these times. Again, the degree of transmission from the overnight market to
other markets will depend on the range of participation in these markets and the ease of arbitrage
among them.
The variety of monetary policy procedures pursued by central banks thus could potentially affect
short-term interest rate volatility through a number of different channels. Given that there are sound
theoretical arguments for the existence of each of these channels, empirical analysis is needed to
determine which channels are in fact relevant to observed interest-rate volatility patterns and which are
not.
4. A GARCH model of volatility transmission
Modelling the overnight rate
Daily short-term interest rate data (policy rate, overnight rate, and 1, 3, 6 and 12-month rates) were
compiled for nine of the countries discussed above: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Spain, the UK and the US Data were available for periods of between four and eight years, starting at
different dates but all ending at or close to May 31 1998. Where possible, domestic interbank rates
were used. The specific rates used are presented in Table 2.
3 Simple statistics for the series (levels and
first differences) are shown in Table 3.
As with many financial series, money market interest rates display periods of volatility and periods of
calm. Sharp movements in rates usually are not isolated occurrences, but are accompanied by further
(but usually diminishing) volatility as the market seeks to discover a new equilibrium level. This
suggests that an appropriate model for analysing the volatility of these rates would be the generalised
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model developed by Engle (1982) and
Bollerslev (1986).
Following Ayuso, Haldane and Restoy (1997), the relationship between the overnight rate and the
policy rate is modelled as an autoregressive error-correction process with GARCH (1,1) residuals.
4
Specifically, the following model is used to express the daily change in the overnight rate  o i  as a
function of its own past innovations, current and past innovations of the policy rate  p i , and the lagged
difference between the overnight and the policy rate:
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This specification has a number of attractive features. It allows the overnight rate to converge towards
the target rate at a rate related to b . It allows changes in the policy rate  p i  to be incorporated into the
overnight rate partly contemporaneously (through the effect of  o d , the coefficient on  t p i , D ) and partly
over a period of adjustment lasting up to five days, that is, one business week. Because it is a
3 Japan did not explicitly announce a policy rate target until recently. For the purpose of this exercise, a synthetic target
rate was constructed by examining patterns of plateaus and jumps in overnight rate levels.
4 The exponential (EGARCH) model used by Ayuso, Haldane and Restoy, and the GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) model
of Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) were experimented with and found not to add much to what is presented here.5
GARCH(1,1) model, the coefficients from the variance equation can be conveniently interpreted as the
autocorrelation (a ) and the persistence ( b a + ) of volatility. One or more seasonal dummies can be
inserted into the mean and/or variance equations, so that we can allow for day-of-the-month,
reserve-maintenance and other periodic effects both in the level of overnight rates and their variances.
Table 4 identifies the seasonal dummies that were used for each country; these were chosen essentially
through trial and error, informed by knowledge about the reserve-maintenance schedules in the
different countries.
5 A trend term is included in the variance equation for certain series (namely those
where it was found to be significant), in order to capture the tendency for money-market volatility to
fall in the course of the estimated time-sample. In some cases, a seasonal dummy is interacted with a
time-trend, to capture the tendency of seasonal effects to rise or fall over the sample period.
For several of the countries examined, the history of short-term rates over the period includes a small
number of very sharp rate increases and falls. This is especially true for the European countries during
1992 and 1993. To reduce the influence of these observations, without biasing the sample by removing
them entirely, any rate increase of more than one percentage point in absolute value is re-defined to be
equal to one or negative one. The number of affected observations for each country is given in the last
column  of Table 3. The  series  with the  largest  number  of  such  censored  observations  is  the  UK
overnight rate, for which 92 of 2,123, or about 4%, are censored. In no other series are more than 2%
of observations censored.
Table  5 presents the key coefficients from the estimated models for overnight rates for the nine
countries. Coefficients found to be significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level, using
the quasi-maximum-likelihood standard errors proposed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), are in
boldface. A number of observations are worth mentioning about these results.
First, an error-correction mechanism seems to be at play in each case, although the strength of the
effect varies widely. The coefficient varies from –0.07 in the case of France and Italy to –0.76 in the
case of the US
Second, with some manipulation of the estimated coefficients, we can approximate the “medium-run”
sensitivity of the overnight rate to the policy rate. Of course, in the long term, given an
error-correction coefficient that is between zero and minus one, a one-unit increase in the policy rate
will always lead to a one-unit increase in the overnight rate. A statistic indicating how quick this
happens, however, can be developed first by expressing the basic model in terms of lag polynomials,
where L represents the lag operator ( 1 - = t t x Lx ) and f(L) represents the lag polynomial
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The last, approximate equality is justified if we can drop the second term in the second equation. This
in turn will be the case if the two interest rates,  o i and  p i are sufficiently “close” to each other, relative
to their size, and if the error-correction coefficient b is sufficiently small. Assuming these conditions
5 Interestingly, month-end effects were present even in countries, such as the US, where the reserve-maintenance period
does not coincide with the calendar month. Hamilton (1996), who finds significant quarter-end and year-end effects for
the US Federal Funds rate, suggests that this reflects “window-dressing” activities by corporations at fiscal year-ends.
Estimated values for the seasonal dummy terms are available from the author.6
hold, and replacing L by one, we can obtain the approximate medium-run sensitivity of the overnight


























The countries separate into two fairly well-defined groups in terms of the values of this statistic
(Table 5). For Australia, the UK, Japan, Canada and Spain, a one-unit change in the policy rate shows
up, on average, as a close-to-one unit change in the overnight rate after five days. For the US, France,
Germany and Italy, no more than 50% of a policy-rate change is reflected in the overnight rate after
five days. Of these four, however, the sensitivity measure is probably least accurate for the US,
because its error-correction figure of 0.76 is relatively high. Indeed, this figure suggests that 76% of
the difference between overnight and policy rates in the US disappears after one day. As for France,
Italy and Germany, it would not be true to say that the overnight rate in these does not respond to the
policy rate, only that overnight rates are so “noisy” that the effect of a policy rate is swamped by other
effects in a given five-day time period.
A third observation about the results in Table 5 is that the variance models for all nine countries show
significant ARCH effects (i.e. the  s ’ a are significantly different from zero). Six of them also show
GARCH effects (i.e. the  s ’ b  are significantly different from zero). Three (Australia, the UK and
Germany) have a persistence statistic ( b a + ) greater than one, meaning that the variance process
does not tend towards a mean value in a predictable way.
6
Finally, trend terms were found to be significant for three of the nine countries: France, Canada and
Spain. In each case, the trend was negative.
Modelling money-market rates
Similar models to that used for the overnight rate, only without error-correction terms, were then
estimated for one, three, six and twelve-month interbank rates. The fitted GARCH variances (
2 ˆ s )
from the overnight-rate model were used as right-hand side variables in the variance equations for the
longer-term interest rates. Trend terms were not used, because these created severe instability for the
estimated coefficients.
 7 Table 6 lists the values of the key variables of interest, from the variance
equations of the estimated systems.
The first column of Table 6 gives the average fitted GARCH variances for the one to twelve-month
rates. These tend to fall as maturity rises (except in the case of Canada), suggesting that uncertainty
about the path of future rates and risk premia, which are normally thought to rise as one travels out the
yield curve, are not the primary source of day-to-day volatility in these interest rates. As discussed in
Section 2, this implies that market liquidity conditions may well play the primary role in determining
the observed volatility levels.
The ARCH and GARCH coefficients for the money-market rates indicate both strong autocorrelation
(a ) and strong persistence ( b a + ). Both parameters tend to be lower at longer maturities than
shorter ones. This suggests that, at longer maturities, shocks to volatility do not feed as strongly into
6 As Nelson (1990) points out, this does not necessarily mean that the variance process is nonstationary, so statistical
inference can still be performed on the estimated parameters.
7 Including a trend term in the variance equation was found to produce instability in the estimated coefficients for the one
to twelve-month interest rate models, though not for the overnight-rate models. It is not clear why this should have been
so.7
subsequent periods of volatility but also die out more slowly. In other words, high and short-lived
“spikes” are more common at short maturities than at long ones. However, as suggested by
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), the very high persistence levels found for several of the overnight
rates and for most of the other money-market rates may imply a misspecification of the volatility
process resulting from structural change in the course of the time period studied.
The fourth column of Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients on the fitted overnight-rate GARCH
variances. These measure the “transmission” of volatility from overnight rates to rates at other
maturities. Most of these coefficients (29 out of 36) are positive, of which ten are significantly so. Of
the seven negative coefficients, however, six are significantly negative, including all four of those for
the German rates. Ayuso, Haldane and Restoy (1997) find similar results for Germany. This suggests
that the possibility of “volatility transfer” cannot be ruled out.
5. Interpreting the results
This section will attempt to relate some of the stylised facts about volatility in overnight rates and
other money-market rates identified in the previous section to the characteristics of monetary policy
procedures discussed in Section 3.
Policy rate target
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK target a tender rate with a maturity between one day and
one month, while for the other countries in this study the overnight rate itself is targeted. It thus comes
as no surprise that policy rate changes tended to be more rapidly incorporated into overnight rates for
the second set of countries than the first (Table 5). As noted above, Australia, Canada and Japan have
figures for the sensitivity of overnight to policy rates that are close to one, while the US has a high
error-correction term, suggesting that the central banks in these countries generally succeed over a
one-week horizon in their efforts to target overnight rates.
Table 7 takes average values of the variables of interest for countries in the three groups outlined in
Section 3. It comes as no surprise that overnight rate volatility tends to be lower in the
overnight-rate-targeting group than among the repo-rate targeters. It is interesting to note, however,
that fitted variances at the other four maturities were also lower, on average, for the overnight rate
targeters, even though the country with the lowest average fitted variance (Germany) is a member of
the repo-rate targeting group. A tentative conclusion that may be drawn from this is that targeting the
overnight rate stabilises not just the overnight market, but also other money markets as well. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that there is no systematic difference between the two groups in
volatility-transmission parameters (the coefficient on overnight fitted variance). Other things being
equal, more stable overnight rates do lead to more stable rates at other maturities; this seems to be the
case both for countries that target overnight rates and for countries that do not.
The UK is listed separately because, unlike the other repo-rate targeters, it does not attempt to stabilise
the overnight rate. As might be expected, the level and persistence of the volatility of this rate is higher
for the UK than for other countries. The low coefficients on the variance of the UK overnight rate,
however, indicate that there is relatively little transmission of this volatility to other points on the yield
curve.
The frequency of intervention
The three countries that have both a low long-run sensitivity of policy and overnight rates and a low
error-correction coefficient, France, Italy and Germany, do not normally intervene at a daily frequency
(Table 3). This may explain why the UK, where interventions occur several times a day, sees a more
rapid incorporation of the policy rate into the overnight rate, even though it does not explicitly target
overnight rates. It is unclear why policy rates are also rapidly incorporated into overnight rates in8
Spain, which according to Table 1 intervenes at roughly the same frequency as the other continental
European countries studied.
Reserve requirements
Three of the countries studied, Australia, the UK and Canada, have “working balance requirements”
rather than reserve requirements. Australia and Canada are the only countries where no transmission
effect was found between overnight-rate volatility and volatility at other maturities. The UK has
relatively low coefficients of volatility transmission between overnight and other rates, though two of
these are significant (Table 6). This may suggest that strict reserve requirements somehow work to tie
overnight rates more closely to other interbank rates, so that periods of volatility in the overnight
market are more likely to lead banks to adjust their assets and liabilities at other parts of the maturity
spectrum as well.
“Volatility transfer”
The negative coefficients on overnight-rate volatility in the variance models for Germany, Japan and
Italy represent a puzzle. One possibility is that they reflect hidden trend effects. For example, if
overnight-rate volatility trended downward over the sample period while the volatility of other rates
rose, and if these trends were insufficiently incorporated into the model, this might produce a negative
coefficient. This might especially be the case if, as in the case of Germany, month-end effects are
strong and variable. While attempts were made to account for changes in the size of month-end effects
over time, it is possible that the residuals still contain trends of this kind.
Another possibility is that uncertain conditions in overnight markets cause a withdrawal of activity
from other short-term markets, leading to smaller rate-movements in the latter. However, it is just as
plausible that thin trading conditions in these markets should lead to higher volatility.
6. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the volatility characteristics of daily changes in overnight rates and in four
other short-term interest rates in nine countries, as well as the effect of overnight-rate volatility on the
volatility of the other short-term rates. It is found that, in countries where monetary policy involves the
direct targeting of overnight rates, changes in policy rates are more rapidly incorporated into overnight
rates than in countries that do not. One exception to this pattern seems to be the UK, where overnight
rates are very volatile but incorporate policy rate changes relatively quickly. It is also found that, on
average, countries in the overnight-rate-targeting group have less volatile interest rates at all
maturities, from overnight to one year, and that there is no consistent pattern in the transmission of
volatility from overnight rates to other rates in either group.
Reserve requirements are not found to have a direct effect on volatility. However, transmission of
volatility across interest rates at different maturities seemed to be lower among countries without
reserve requirements. This may suggest that attempts to maintain required reserves affect bank balance
sheets more broadly, rather than just the supply of and demand for overnight funds, so that periods of
uncertainty in the overnight funds market are more likely to spill over to the market for funds at other
maturities.
A number of puzzles emerge from the study, suggesting avenues for further analysis. One is the
presence of “volatility transfer” in some countries, where times of unusually high volatility in
overnight markets correspond to unusually low volatility at other maturities and vice versa. Another is
the high level of persistence found in the volatility processes for most of the interest rate series
studied, which suggests the need for specifications that more explicitly account for the possibility of
structural change in the underlying stochastic process.9
Finally, as noted in Section  2, techniques need to be found for separating the effects of market
uncertainty about the path of interest rates from the effects of fluctuations in the supply and demand
for funds at different maturities. This would enable us to ascertain more precisely the extent to which
the patterns identified here reflect differences in conditions of market liquidity across countries.10
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Key features of operating procedures
AU AT BE CA FR DE IT JP NL ES SE CH UK US
Key policy rate O/N target tender tender O/N target tender tender tender O/N tender tender tender – tender O/N target
· maturity (days) 1 14 7-15 1 7 14 <30 1 2-8 10 7 – 1-33 1
Operating target1 O/N O/N S-T O/N O/N O/N O/N O/N S-T O/N O/N giro deps. S-T O/N2
· maturity (days) 1 1 30-90 1 1 1 1 1 30 1 1 – 30-90 1
Corridor3 (bp) 225 225 50 150 200 150 4 1505 6
Working balances * * *7 *8 * *
Reserve requirements * **** * * *
· maintenance period) 1m 1m 1m 1m 1m 10d 1m 2w
Main operation RT RP RP9 TGD RP RP RT RT CL10 RP RT FXS OT RT
· maturity (days) av. 7 14 7-15 111 7 14  1-90 2-8 10 7 80-120 1-33 1-15
· regular interval * * * * * * 12 13 *14 * * *14 15
· frequency 1 x d 1 x w 1 x w 1 x d 2 x w 1 x w [Z [G 1 x 4d 1 x 10d 1 x w §[Z [G §[G
Overall frequency 1 x d §[Z >1 x d >1 x d >1 x w §[Z >1 x w >1 x d >1 x w >1 x w >1 x w §[G >1 x d §[G
Key signals
· announcement target * *16 *
· tender17 * *18 * * * * * * *
· standing facility * * * * *** * * 19
· other *20 *20 *20 *20 *20 *20
Note: Abbreviations used: RT = reversed transaction (repo or reverse repo); RP = reversed purchase (repo); TGD = transfer of government deposits; CL = collateralised loan; FXS = foreign
exchange swap; * = yes; (blank) = no; O/N = overnight; S-T = short-term.
1  Interest rate unless otherwise stated.   2  Federal funds rate.   3  Either largely self-enforcing or requiring active steering of the overnight rate by the central bank; width measured in basis
points, end-September 1996.   4  Overnight rate normally steered within an unpublished corridor of 20-50 basis points, depending on circumstances.   5  Since September 1996 the overnight rate
has been steered within a +/-10 basis points range via fine-tuning transactions at the corresponding rates.   6  Deviations of one to three-month rates from the stop rate monitored closely.
7  Averaging around a zero reserve requirement (one month).   8  Demand for overdraft credit granted under the quota scheme to effect payments.   9  Or collateralised loans, depending on assets
backing the transaction.   10  Special advances, which are granted through a tender procedure and can be viewed as equivalent to RP transactions.   11  Transfer of demand deposits.   12  On
average, every four days.   13  At least two operations per day.   14  Not completely fixed.   15  Almost every day.   16  Bounds of operating band; normally the market takes the midpoint as the
target.   17  Refers to the main operation shown above.   18  Tenders are conducted at the central rate, which can be changed at any time.   19  The discount rate had a clear signalling role until the




Country Policy rate Overnight rate 1-month interbank 3-month interbank 6-month interbank 1-year interbank
Australia Policy target rate (23.1.90) Unofficial overnight rate 1-month interbank rate 3-month interbank rate 6-month interbank rate 1-month interbank rate
Canada Operating band, low (15.4.94) Overnight money market
financing
1-month euro-rate 3-month euro-rate 6-month euro-rate 12-month euro-rate
France BoF tender rate Day-to-day loans 1-month PIBOR 3-month PIBOR 6-month PIBOR 12-month PIBOR
Germany Bbk repo rate Day-to-day money 1-month FIBOR
(2.7.90)
3-month FIBOR 6-month FIBOR 12-month FIBOR (2.7.90)
Italy BdI, bill purchases (min rate)
and BdI, bill sales (max rate)
Overnight interbank
deposits
1-month euro-rate 3-month interbank loans
(27.2.90)
6-month interbank 12-month interbank
(30.7.93)
Japan Constructed series from
obvious jumps in overnight
rate (25.2.91)













































Australia (sample: 1.23.90 – 5.22.98, 2,128 observations)





Policy rate 7.588 3.097 17.00 4.75
Overnight 7.602 3.104 17.50 4.68
1-month 7.546 2.922 16.62 4.73
3-month 7.518 2.847 16.00 4.60
6-month 7.550 2.810 15.62 4.64
12-month 7.729 2.765 15.81 4.17
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0053 0.0812 1.00 – 1.00 1
Overnight – 0.0056 0.0926 0.96 – 1.00 4
1-month – 0.0053 0.0856 0.81 – 1.00 2
3-month – 0.0051 0.0776 0.56 – 0.81 0
6-month – 0.0049 0.0715 0.41 – 0.66 0
12-month – 0.0048 0.1002 1.00 – 1.00 4
Canada (sample: 4.15.94 – 5.29.98, 1,028 observations)





Policy rate 4.691 1.464 7.75 2.75
Overnight 4.953 1.466 8.38 2.88
1-month 4.871 1.433 8.19 2.78
3-month 5.027 1.447 8.37 2.75
6-month 5.240 1.462 8.56 2.81
12-month 5.593 1.460 9.12 3.06
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0097 0.0584 0.50 – 0.25 0
Overnight – 0.0008 0.1313 0.56 – 0.54 0
1-month – 0.0007 0.1031 0.83 – 0.50 0
3-month – 0.0006 0.1207 0.88 – 0.82 0
6-month – 0.0010 0.1190 0.75 – 0.57 0
12-month – 0.0013 0.1226 0.57 – 0.56 014
Table 3 (cont.)
Japan (sample: 3.2.93 – 5.27.98, 1,278 observations)





Policy rate 1.311 0.996 3.19 0.45
Overnight 1.339 1.010 4.50 0.22
1-month 1.426 0.975 3.59 0.48
3-month 1.402 0.937 3.27 0.48
6-month 1.478 0.936 3.44 0.53
12-month 1.579 0.948 3.50 0.57
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0021 0.0291 0.00 – 0.50 0
Overnight – 0.0022 0.0761 1.00 – 1.00 4
1-month – 0.0022 0.0536 0.45 – 0.48 0
3-month – 0.0021 0.0205 0.11 – 0.39 0
6-month – 0.0020 0.0271 0.18 – 0.22 0
12-month – 0.0020 0.0294 0.17 – 0.18 0
United States (sample: 1.2.90 – 5.28.98, 2,096 observations)





Policy rate 5.131 1.493 8.25 3.00
Overnight 5.186 1.519 10.39 2.58
1-month 5.192 1.443 8.37 3.00
3-month 5.310 1.465 8.61 3.03
6-month 5.028 1.488 8.02 2.68
12-month 5.247 1.490 8.36 2.80
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0013 0.0405 0.75 – 0.20 0
Overnight – 0.0034 0.2603 1.00 – 1.00 39
1-month – 0.0013 0.0484 0.73 – 0.49 0
3-month – 0.0013 0.0465 0.42 – 0.58 0
6-month – 0.0010 0.0344 0.30 – 0.43 0
12-month – 0.0009 0.0417 0.30 – 0.37 015
Table 3 (cont.)
France (sample 1.1.90 – 5.20.98, 2,135 observations)





Policy rate 6.509 2.576 10.00 3.10
Overnight 7.064 2.891 24.06 3.19
1-month 7.199 2.848 18.81 3.31
3-month 7.123 2.799 15.20 3.31
6-month 7.159 2.699 13.28 3.28
12-month 7.129 2.610 11.75 3.28
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0031 0.0309 0.50 – 0.35 0
Overnight – 0.0073 0.1333 1.00 – 1.00 14
1-month – 0.0047 0.1649 1.00 – 1.00 24
3-month – 0.0035 0.1418 1.00 – 1.00 14
6-month – 0.0036 0.1150 1.00 – 1.00 6
12-month – 0.0034 0.0822 0.75 – 0.92 0
Germany (sample: 7.2.90 – 5.25.98, 1,978 observations)





Policy rate 5.93 2.42 9.70 3.00
Overnight 6.01 2.42 9.80 2.50
1-month 6.10 2.46 9.90 3.09
3-month 6.12 2.47 9.93 3.10
6-month 6.11 2.45 9.95 3.12
12-month 6.12 2.38 9.94 3.19
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0023 0.0315 0.50 – 0.50 0
Overnight – 0.0034 0.2075 1.00 – 1.00 37
1-month – 0.0023 0.0360 0.85 – 0.31 0
3-month – 0.0023 0.0267 0.24 – 0.35 0
6-month – 0.0024 0.0264 0.24 – 0.36 0
12-month – 0.0025 0.0295 0.28 – 0.32 016
Table 3 (cont.)
Italy (sample 5.28.93 – 5.20.98, 1,247 observations)





Policy rate 8.488 1.410 10.86 5.51
Overnight 8.499 1.410 11.08 4.79
1-month 8.354 1.411 11.63 5.20
3-month 8.513 1.539 11.93 5.01
6-month 8.509 1.713 12.31 4.73
12-month 8.535 1.961 12.63 4.56
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0042 0.1117 1.00 – 0.84 1
Overnight – 0.0035 0.2037 1.00 – 1.00 18
1-month – 0.0044 0.1275 1.00 – 1.00 2
3-month – 0.0046 0.0926 1.00 – 0.47 1
6-month – 0.0050 0.1184 1.00 – 0.94 1
12-month – 0.0053 0.1182 1.00 – 0.94 2
Spain (sample: 12.19.91 – 5.22.98, 1,593 observations)





Policy rate 8.690 2.722 13.75 4.25
Overnight 8.964 3.024 26.48 4.27
1-month 9.011 3.046 17.88 4.35
3-month 8.963 2.984 15.55 4.30
6-month 8.907 2.942 15.38 1.18
12-month 8.936 2.938 15.20 4.05
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0052 0.0711 0.75 – 1.00 1
Overnight – 0.0075 0.2090 1.00 – 1.00 28
1-month – 0.0052 0.1588 1.00 – 1.00 10
3-month – 0.0050 0.0983 1.00 – 1.00 2
6-month – 0.0053 0.1033 1.00 – 1.00 4
12-month – 0.0055 0.0986 0.95 – 1.05 017
Table 3 (cont.)
United Kingdom (sample 1.2.90 – 5.26.98, 2,123 observations)





Policy rate 8.191 3.137 14.88 5.13
Overnight 8.204 3.266 15.63 3.44
1-month 8.287 3.190 15.96 4.88
3-month 8.321 3.115 15.47 5.05
6-month 8.331 3.024 15.66 5.02
12-month 8.423 2.872 15.94 5.03
First differences
Policy rate – 0.0036 0.0639 0.50 – 1.00 2
Overnight – 0.0028 0.3700 1.00 – 1.00 92
1-month – 0.0031 0.0993 1.00 – 1.00 5
3-month – 0.0031 0.0770 0.99 – 1.00 2
6-month – 0.0029 0.0798 0.84 – 1.00 2
12-month – 0.0029 0.0896 0.78 – 1.00 218
Table 4
Seasonal dummies
Dummies in mean equation Dummies in variance equation
Australia First day of month
Last day of month
First or last day of month
Canada First day of month
Last day of month
First or last day of month
Japan First day of month
First day of month * time trend
Last day of month
Last day of month * time trend
Last day of March
First day of April
First or last day of month
Last of March or first of April
United States First day of month
Last day of month
Mon. of settlement week
Wed. of settlement week
First or last day of month
Mon. or Tue. of settlement week
Wed. or Thur. of settlement week
France First day of month
Last day of month
15th or 16th of month
First or last day of month
15th or 16th of month
Germany Last two days of month
Last two days of month * time trend
First day of month
First day of month * time trend
First day or last two days of month
Italy First day of month
14th of month
15th of month
Last day of month
First or last day of month
14th or 15th of month
Spain First day of month
Last day of month
First or last day of month
Italy First day of month
Last day of month
First or last day of month19
Table 5
Selected coefficients from overnight-rate model estimation
AU CA JP US FR DE IT ES UK
Mean equation
b –0 . 2 8 –0 . 3 9 –0 . 1 0 –0 . 7 6 –0 . 0 7 –0 . 2 0 –0 . 0 7 –0 . 0 9 –0 . 2 0
(9.73) (8.08) (4.19) (13.33) (10.22) (4.57) (3.34) (3.35) (9.94)
c –0 . 5 1 –0 . 8 6 –0 . 7 2 –0 . 2 2 0.20 – 0.32 –0 . 4 9 –0 . 3 8 –0 . 9 4
d 1.42 1.88 1.73 0.21 0.40 0.24 0.38 1.17 1.88
“¨io/¨ip” 0.94 1.01 1.00 0.27 0.50 0.18 0.26 0.85 0.97
Variance equation
4.6e-5 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.004 0.16 2.9e-4
(3.75) (2.30) (3.52) (7.86) (4.00) (7.35) (5.66) (3.78) (1.39)
0.41 0.13 0.47 0.33 0.19 0.66 1.27 0.36 0.23
(4.91) (3.32) (4.07) (4.25) (2.44) (2.57) (6.43) (3.42) (8.93)
0.67 0.52 0.45 0.01 0.55 –0 . 0 1 0.08 0.02 0.79
(16.71) (3.05) (4.60) (0.58) (4.80) (2.42) (2.296) (0.11) (41.04)
 1.08 0.65 0.92 0.34 0.74 0.65 1.35 0.38 1.02
–3 . 7 e - 6 –4 . 6 e - 6 –3 . 1 e - 5
(2.30) (3.91) (3.13)
Mean
2 ˆ s 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.041 0.007 0.031 0.062 0.044 0.113
Bold-faced figures are significant at the 95% level. T-statistics using standard errors calculated according to Bollerslev
and Wooldridge (1992) are in parentheses.
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2 ˆ s ” is the average fitted value for
2
t s  from this estimation.20
Table 6
Results from models of money-market interest rates
Average fitted
variance (









1-month 0.0126 0.6123 1.288 0.0104
3-month 0.0084 0.3479 1.097 0.0233
6-month 0.0051 0.0775 0.984 0.0066
12-month 0.0082 0.1470 0.737 0.0477
Canada
1-month 0.0089 0.2203 0.920 0.0003
3-month 0.0117 0.1096 0.920 0.0394
6-month 0.0124 0.1880 0.771 0.1083
12-month 0.0165 0.0240 0.950 0.0121
Japan
1-month 0.0027 0.4680 0.879 –0 . 0 0 9 2
3-month 0.0004 0.3445 0.975 0.0118
6-month 0.0009 0.2856 1.017 0.0027
12-month 0.0011 0.3029 1.053 0.0006
United States
1-month 0.0023 0.4921 1.030 0.0073
3-month 0.0019 0.1184 0.992 –0 . 0 0 0 3
6-month 0.0011 0.1368 0.951 0.0038
12-month 0.0012 0.0236 0.976 0.0014
France
1-month 0.0360 0.3603 1.081 0.0090
3-month 0.0229 0.2349 1.023 0.0075
6-month 0.0142 0.2009 1.001 0.0127
12-month 0.0072 0.2197 0.963 0.0119
Germany
1-month 0.0017 0.3328 0.480 –0 . 0 0 1 2
3-month 0.0008 0.0290 0.919 –0 . 0 0 0 3
6-month 0.0007 0.0493 0.906 –0 . 0 0 0 2













1-month 0.0158 0.0857 0.963 0.0001
3-month 0.0101 0.2231 1.015 0.0008
6-month 0.0161 0.1839 1.000 –0 . 0 0 1 5
12-month 0.0144 0.0899 0.974 –0 . 0 0 1 4
Spain
1-month 0.0309 0.7414 0.976 0.0379
3-month 0.0117 0.2149 1.038 0.0009
6-month 0.0114 0.2192 0.988 0.0072
12-month 0.0115 0.2043 0.708 0.0707
United Kingdom
1-month 0.0182 0.9512 1.363 0.0041
3-month 0.0070 0.3223 0.971 0.0010
6-month 0.0077 0.3151 1.027 0.0012
12-month 0.0092 0.3754 0.934 0.0023
Bold-faced figures are significant at the 95% level
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where it is the 1, 3, 6 or 12-month interest rate; d95-98 is a dummy variable equalling one for observations in 1995 or later;
and 
2 ˆON s  is the fitted variance from that country’s overnight-rate estimation (see Table 1).
“Mean
2 ˆ s ” is the average fitted value for
2
t s  from this estimation.22
Table 7
Volatility parameters for the United States, Japan, Canada and Australia
Average fitted
variance (








Overnight rate 0.0141 0.3383 0.7514
1-month 0.0066 0.4482 1.0292 0.0022
3-month 0.0056 0.2301 0.9958 0.0185
6-month 0.0049 0.1720 0.9315 0.0303
12-month 0.0068 0.1244 0.9288 0.0155
Volatility parameters for France, Germany, Italy and Spain
Average fitted
variance (








Overnight rate 0.0399 0.6231 0.7813
1-month 0.0211 0.3801 0.8749 0.0114
3-month 0.0114 0.1754 0.9986 0.0022
6-month 0.0106 0.1633 0.9739 0.0046
12-month 0.0085 0.1529 0.8890 0.0203
Volatility parameters for the United Kingdom
Average fitted
variance (








Overnight rate 0.1127 0.2256 1.0135
1-month 0.0182 0.9512 1.3630 0.0041
3-month 0.0070 0.3223 0.9706 0.0010
6-month 0.0077 0.3151 1.0267 0.0012
12-month 0.0092 0.3754 0.9335 0.0023